We consider an equilibrium forward contract on a nonstorable commodity when forward market participants have market powers. The forward contract is negotiated through a Nash bargaining process due to market powers. We derive the unique equilibrium forward contract in closed form and provide an extensive comparative statics analysis. We show in particular that the introduction of a forward market may increase both the production of the commodity and the trading volume in the spot market. We then calibrate our model to an electricity data set and conduct a numerical analysis. We find that in contrast to the forward price on a storable commodity, the forward price on a nonstorable can be nonmonotonic in the spot price. We show that the forward price can be a downward or an upward biased predictor of the spot price, depending on the convenience yield level and the market power. In addition, both the forward price volatility and the open interest volatility decrease with the time to maturity. Furthermore, for commodities with low (high) convenience yield, the open interest is greater for a shorter (longer) maturity forward. 
Markets for physically or economically nonstorable commodities have in recent years grown significantly in trading volume, commodity variety, and innovative contract specification.
1 Unlike market participants in a typical market for storable commodities, buyers and sellers in a market for nonstorable commodities usually have significant market powers. These powers stem mainly from the limited market participation caused by nonstorability and also from market frictions such as location preferences, transportation costs, longterm business relationships, and asymmetric information. 2 Furthermore, in many industries where storage is physically or economically infeasible, there often exists an almost exclusive supply relationship between a supplier and a manufacturer to assure timely delivery, and accordingly, supply contracts for future delivery are usually negotiated bilaterally.
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A vast literature exists on pricing derivatives written on storable commodities. 4 In contrast, even though the literature on pricing derivatives on nonstorable commodities has grown considerably since the deregulation of the electricity market, 5 it is still relatively limited partly due to the inapplicability of the well known no-arbitrage argument. 6 In addition, in this limited literature, derivative markets are usually assumed to be perfectly competitive and hence market powers of the participants are ignored. For example, both Kawai (1983) and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) assume that both the producers and the consumers are price takers in derivative markets.
In this paper, we consider an equilibrium forward contract on a nonstorable commodity between a supplier and a manufacturer in an imperfectly competitive forward market. Both the supplier and the manufacturer have significant market powers and negotiate the forward contract through a Nash bargaining process. 7 In addition to the forward, they can also trade in a spot market for the commodity. The supplier produces the commodity, and the manufacturer uses the commodity to produce a final product. The supplier is subject to both uncertain production costs and commodity spot price risk. In addition to the commodity spot price risk, the manufacturer also faces final product price risk and commodity demand risk. Following 1 For example, the deregulation of the electricity industry has created enormous spot and derivative markets for electricity. In addition, many industries have recently introduced online markets for raw materials that are either physically or economically infeasible to store. 2 For example, Green and Newbery (1992) , Newbery (1995) and Wolfram (1999) find that participants in the British power markets have market powers. Also, as Krapels (2000) points out, "regional over-the-counter markets are the centers of price dynamics, with very limited potential for participation in trading by organized or individual speculators." 3 For example, the majority of electricity trading is through bilateral contracts. In particular, only about 25% of all traded electricity in Norway-Sweden is managed by Nord Pool; the rest is handled by physical contracts in the bilateral wholesale market (Hjalmarsson (2000) ).
4 See for example, Ng and Pirrong (1994) , Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) , Brennan and Crew (1996) , Chambers and Bailey (1996) , Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) , and the references therein.
5 Some examples include Eydeland and Geman (1999) , Pirrong and Jermaykyan (1999) , and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) . 6 For details on the standard no-arbitrage forward pricing model, see, for example, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) . 7 As Nash (1950) shows, the Nash bargaining solution is the only one that is Paretian, symmetric, and that is independent of utility units and irrelevant alternatives (see also Proposition 22.E.1 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995) . Rolfo (1980) , Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1993) , and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) , we assume that both the supplier and the manufacturer have (different) mean-variance preferences over their future risky profits.
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We derive the unique equilibrium forward contract in closed form. We show that a forward contract can help a participant both improve profitability ("speculation benefit") and reduce profit risk ("hedging benefit"). We find that the manufacturer's total profit risk (from the forward and from the spot) is usually reduced with a forward. In contrast, the supplier's total profit is always riskier with a forward contract.
However, this does not imply that the supplier always uses the forward to speculate on a possibly higher profit. In fact, he usually uses the forward to reduce risk, while using the spot market to improve profitability.
In other words, without the forward, the supplier's total profit risk would be even higher. In addition, we
show that the market powers of the participants only affect the equilibrium forward price, but not its contract size (which can also be interpreted as open interest). Furthermore, the introduction of a forward market may increase both the production of the commodity and the trading volume in the spot market. This is mainly due to the sharing of the speculation and hedging benefits from a forward.
Since the electricity forward market is one of the biggest forward markets on nonstorable commodities, we calibrate our model using an electricity forward data set for the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) market. 9 We find that in contrast to a forward on a storable commodity, the forward price on a nonstorable can be nonmonotonic in the spot price. Intuitively, the equilibrium forward price is largely determined by the manufacturer's and supplier's utility gain from the forward and their relative market powers. As the current spot price increases, the expected end-of-maturity spot price increases, and thus the speculation benefit for the manufacturer also increases ("effect on speculation benefit"). This higher speculation benefit raises the forward price because of the bargaining power of the supplier. On the other hand, higher expected end-of-maturity spot price tends to decrease the magnitude of the covariance between the profit from trading in the spot market and the profit from trading in the forward market, partly because it is now less likely that the manufacturer can make a large profit from trading in the spot market. As the covariance shrinks, so does the hedging benefit for the manufacturer ("effect on hedging benefit"). The reduction of the hedging benefit tends to lower the equilibrium forward price because of the bargaining power of the manufacturer. The net effect of an increase in the spot price on the forward price depends on the relative magnitude of these two offsetting effects.
For the calibrated model, we find that the forward price is a downward biased predictor of the spot 8 Firm risk aversion is consistent with the existence of bankruptcy costs, managerial risk aversion, market incompleteness, and the value of the institution's charter (see Keeley (1990) , Chen and Federgruen (2000) , and Ding and Kouvelis (2001) for example). 9 In the energy market covered by PJM, 54% of the trading is through bilateral transactions in 2001, and even for the rest of the traded contracts, telephone negotiation is usually involved (see Laughlin (2003) for example).
price in winter, spring, and fall -and thus exhibits a normal "backwardation" in these seasons. 10 However, it is an upward biased estimate of the spot price in summer. This difference across seasons is mainly driven by changes in the "convenience yield" for the commodity and the market power of the manufacturer. 11 In winter, spring, and fall, the convenience yield is high, which implies that the supplier's capacity reservation cost is only a fraction of the spot price. In addition, the manufacturer also has significant market power.
Therefore the equilibrium forward price stays below the expected spot price. In contrast, in summer the convenience yield is low and the manufacturer's market power is very limited, and thus the opposite pattern arises. This finding on the relationship between the forward price and the expected spot price is consistent with that of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) , who attribute the finding to the difference in the spot price skewness.
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We also find that the forward price volatility decreases as time-to-maturity increases; i.e., the "Samuelson effect" still holds. In contrast, Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) show that the "Samuelson effect" can be violated if the inventory level is high for a forward on a storable. In addition, we find that the equilibrium open interest volatility also decreases with time-to-maturity. Furthermore, this model suggests that for commodities with low (high) convenience yield, the equilibrium open interest is higher for forwards with shorter (longer) maturities. As time-to-maturity increases, the expected end-of-maturity spot prices increase and thus the speculation benefit grows, which makes the forward more attractive to the manufacturer. However, depending on the magnitude of the convenience yield, the end-of-maturity spot price variance may grow so fast as to dominate the speculation benefit and cause the open interest to decrease with time-to-maturity.
Most of the models of futures pricing are silent on why the open interest term structure varies across markets.
One notable exception is Hong (2001) . He develops a dynamic equilibrium model of a futures market to study the term structure of futures price and open interest when the convenience yield is exogenous and stochastic.
He concludes that what affects the future price and open interest term structure is whether the convenience yield shock is transitory or permanent. In contrast, we find that the magnitude of the convenience yield is the driving force behind the open interest term structure in our model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model. Section II derives 10 This implies that the supplier incurs a loss in expectation from trading the forward and trades the forward only to reduce his profit risk. As pointed out by Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) , commodity futures prices are often "backwardated". Kawai (1983) also obtains a similar result in a setting with a perfect competitive forward market. 11 For storable commodities, storing the commodity can yield some benefit or convenience to the owner in terms of either rental or service flows over time or the embedded timing option (see Kaldor (1939) and Working (1948) ). This benefit is usually termed "convenience yield." When the convenience yield is positive, the cash and carry cost net of the convenience yield is lower for a longer maturity forward, and hence the forward price is also lower. In our model on nonstorable commodities, if the supplier's capacity reservation cost decreases with time-to-maturity, then the initial cost required for the final delivery is also lower for a longer maturity forward. Because of this similarity to the storable case, we say that the "convenience yield" for a commodity is high if the capacity reservation cost decreases with time-to-maturity and the cost reduction is large. 12 As opposed to our model, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) assume that the forward market is perfectly competitive, the retailer's resale price is fixed, and the producer and the retailer have the same risk aversion.
the unique equilibrium contract and provides some analytical comparative statics. In Section III, we calibrate our model using the PJM electricity market data set and conduct an extensive numerical analysis. In section IV, we summarize our findings and discuss possible future extensions.
I. The Model
A manufacturer uses an input commodity to produce a final product at time T and sells it to the final product market. We assume that the input commodity is nonstorable (either physically or economically), like electricity.
13 At time t ∈ [0, T ), the time T final product demand D T is uncertain, with mean µ D and standard deviation σ D . This demand will only be realized and observed at time T just before the production.
For simplicity, we assume that D T is also equal to the quantity demanded for the input commodity at time
At any time t ∈ [0, T ], the manufacturer can trade in a forward contract market. We assume that the forward market is not perfectly competitive. Because of the limited number of participants, the existence of asymmetric information about default risk and the costs of dealing with multiple trade partners, we assume, like Dong and Durbin (2003) , that the manufacturer only deals with one supplier for the input commodity. In particular, at time t the manufacturer buys a forward contract (Q t , f t ) that matures at T from this supplier. 14 The supplier must pay a production capacity reservation cost c t per unit at time t, such as the cost of reserving or installing production equipments, to guarantee the production capacity for the commodity at time T . 15 To model the supplier's uncertain production cost at time T , we assume that the supplier's time T marginal production cost w(T ) is proportional to the time T spot price of the commodity, i.e., w(T ) = αp T , where α ∈ [0, 1] is a constant that represents the supplier's technology efficiency. 16 To prevent the supplier's arbitrage at time T , the capacity reservation cost for an immediate delivery must be equal to the revenue from immediately selling the produced final product, i.e., we must have
For simplicity, we assume that c t converges to c T continuously as t approaches T .
After demand is realized at time T , both the manufacturer and the supplier can purchase the commod-13 Though the potential energy used to generate electricity such as coal can be stored, the capacity to quickly convert the potential energy to electricity is usually limited, as suggested by the daytime and nighttime power price differences. 14 If we take the contract size for each forward to be 1 unit, then the magnitude of Qt can also be interpreted as the open interest of the forward contract, i.e., the number of forward contracts outstanding. We will refer to Qt as contract quantity, contract size, or open interest interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper. Also, we allow Qt to be negative. A negative Qt means that the manufacturer agrees at time t to sell Qt units of the components at time T to the supplier at a price of $ft per unit. 15 The time t capacity reservation cost can also be interpreted as the cost of raw materials that should be purchased for the production of the commodity. 16 This is designed to capture the often observed pattern that as the production cost increases, the spot price also increases.
Equivalently, we can model the marginal production cost directly and assume the spot price is proportional to the marginal production cost.
ity from or sell it to a spot market (hereafter, the spot market refers to the spot market for the commodity)
where the commodity is traded at the then spot price p T per unit. The spot market is assumed to be competitive. 17 Let p t denote the spot market price at time t, and let µ pt and σ pt be the time t conditional (on p t ) mean and standard deviation of the time T spot price. We also allow the time T final product unit price s T to be uncertain and possibly correlated with the final product demand D T and the spot price p T .
Following Rolfo (1980) , Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1993) and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) , we assume that both the manufacturer and the supplier have mean-variance preferences over their own risky profits. Specifically, let π m and π s be respectively the manufacturer's and the supplier's profit function at time T . Then, the manufacturer's utility at time t is
and the supplier's utility at time t is
where λ m and λ s are the risk aversion coefficients for the manufacturer and the supplier respectively, and where E t and var t denote the time t conditional expectation and conditional variance respectively. We only consider the region where the utility functions are increasing in profits, i.e., if π 1 > π 2 a.s., then
. We let U m0 and U s0 denote respectively the manufacturer's and the supplier's utility without any forward contract.
Consistent with the findings in the existing literature on derivative markets for nonstorable commodities (Green and Newbery (1992) , Newbery (1995) , Wolfram (1999) , and Krapels (2000)), we assume that the forward market is imperfectly competitive. Since the competitiveness of the manufacturer's industry and the supplier's industry usually dictates the market powers of both manufacturer and supplier in a forward market, we use the standard Nash bargaining game to model the contract negotiation process of these two parties to capture the various degrees of their market powers. Specifically, we assume the arbitrator of the forward contract negotiation maximizes a power-weighted product of their utility gains from the forward contract, i.e.,
subject to the participation constraints (individual rationality conditions),
The much lower default risk in the spot market increases the number of participants and thus the competitiveness in this market. See also Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) for other justifications of this assumption.
where θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the manufacturer's market power.
An outline of the event sequence is as follows:
1. At time t, the supplier and the manufacturer negotiate a forward contract (Q t , f t ).
2. Immediately after the forward transaction, the supplier reserves the capacity K t at the unit capacity reservation cost of c t .
3. The final product demand D T , the final product price s T , and the commodity spot price p T are observed at time T . The delivery of Q t units of the commodity and the payment of f t Q t are then made.
4. At time T , the manufacturer and the supplier can also trade in the commodity spot market at the spot price p T to maximize their profits.
5. The manufacturer then produces the final product and sells it to the final product market at the unit price of s T .
II. Equilibrium Contract and Comparative Statics
We first consider the manufacturer's utility function. Without any forward contract between the supplier and the manufacturer, the manufacturer buys only from the spot market. Let π m0 be the manufacturer's profit at time T when she trades only in the spot market; then, obviously,
The manufacturer's corresponding utility U m0 at time t is given by
If a forward contract (Q t , f t ) is signed at time t, the manufacturer buys the fixed quantity Q t at the unit price of f t from the supplier at time T . She can also buy q m units from the spot market at time T . The quantity q m + Q t represents the amount that the manufacturer uses to produce the final product. Thus the manufacturer's profit π m at time T is given by
The optimal spot market trade size q * m is
Hence
The manufacturer's utility U m (Q t , f t ) is then given by
where
and where
is the time t conditional covariance between the profit from trading in the spot market and the per unit profit from the forward. Combining (1) and (5), the utility gain of the manufacturer from the forward is
Note that the manufacturer's profit π m with a forward contract can be viewed as from two sources:
the first one is the profit of trading in the spot market only, π m0 = (s T − p T ) + D T , and the second one is from trading in the forward market only, (p T − f t ) Q t . The conditional profit covariance COV t determines the manufacturer's hedging benefit from trading the forward contract.
Now we consider the supplier's utility function. Let π s0 be the supplier's profit at time T associated with trading in the spot market only, and let k t be the capacity reservation at time t. Then we have
is the effective marginal cost 18 and r is the risk-free interest rate. The corresponding supplier's utility U s0 is
Define x + = max (x, 0) and x − = max (−x, 0). The optimal capacity reservation is
and the corresponding utility is
18 Trading kt units in the spot market at cost αp T + cte r(T −t) is equivalent to trading (1 − α) kt units in the spot market at the marginal costĉt.
Note that the supplier is willing to produce the commodity (i.e., k t > 0) if and only if the expected spot price is higher than the effective marginal costĉ t .
With a forward contract (Q t , f t ), suppose the supplier reserves capacity K t at time t. Since the marginal production cost w(T ) = αp T is lower than the spot price p T , at time T the supplier will always produce to the full capacity K t at the marginal cost w(T ) and trade K t − Q t in the spot market. Therefore the supplier's profit π s (Q t , f t , K t , p T ) with the contract (Q t , f t ) is given by
The supplier's utility U s with the forward contract (Q t , f t ) can be accordingly written as
The optimal capacity reservation for a given Q t is
The necessary and sufficient condition for a positive capacity reservation (and hence a positive production)
to be optimal isĉ t < µ pt + 2λ s σ 2 pt Q t . This implies an upper bound on the effective marginal costĉ t , i.e., the supplier has to be technically efficient to some degree to be profitable to produce. Thus
Combining (10) and (15), we find the utility gain of the supplier from the forward (Q t , f t ) is
. Given the utility gains of the manufacturer and the supplier, the Nash bargaining game between the manufacturer and the supplier can be written as
subject to the participation constraintsŨ
LetŨ * m andŨ * s denote the manufacturer's and supplier's utility gains at the equilibrium respectively, and let COV t be the conditional covariance as defined in (6). We then have our first main result. Theorem 1. There exists a unique equilibrium (Q * t , f * t ) for the Nash bargaining game (17) such that (1) Ifĉ t < µ pt − λs λm+λs 2λ m COV t (i.e., K * t > 0), then the equilibrium (Q * t , f * t ) can be obtained by
and
Moreover,Ũ *
Proofs of Theorem 1 and other results are given in the Appendix. Several observations common for cases with and without production are now in order. First, at the equilibrium, the manufacturer's and supplier's utility gains are balanced such that the ratio of their relative utility gain is equal to the ratio of their relative market power. This implies that the maximization of the weighted individual utility gains is reduced to the maximization of the total utility gain. The first order conditions (FOCs) (18) and (20) suggest that the arbitrator chooses Q t to maximize the total utility gain. This is because a forward contract is a zero-sum game and the forward price does not affect the profit variances. Hence the forward price does not affect the total utility gain. Instead, the forward price f t serves the role of distributing the total utility gain between the manufacturer and the supplier. The first (second) bracketed terms in the FOCs (19) and (21) represent the required forward price for the manufacturer (supplier) to achieve the minimum utility that is necessary for her (his) participation in the forward contract. Accordingly, the equilibrium forward price is the weighted sum of the manufacturer's required forward price and the supplier's required forward price.
Since the manufacturer and the supplier prefer a forward price as close as possible to the required price of the other party, the resulting equilibrium forward price is such that the ratio of their utility gain is equal to the ratio of their corresponding negotiation power.
Note that the equilibrium capacity K * t as defined in (14) and the amount the supplier trades in the spot market K * t − Q * t may be higher than the capacity k * t (which is also his trading volume in the spot market) as defined in (9) before the introduction of a forward market. For example, whenĉ t < µ pt and
19 In this case, the introduction of a forward market increases not only the production of the commodity but also the trading volume in the spot market.
represents the difference between the supplier's profit variance with a forward contract and without one. Ifĉ t > µ pt , then it is not profitable to produce when there is no forward market. With a forward market, as long as the marginal costĉ t is not too high, the supplier will produce to help fulfill the forward contract (Q t , f t ). Sinceĉ t > µ pt in this case, we have U − s0 > 0, and thus the supplier bears increased risk by trading the forward contract to speculate on a possibly higher profit from the contract. It is possible that the supplier will also trade in the spot market to meet part of the forward contract. This again suggests that the introduction of a forward market may increase not only the production of the commodity, but also the trading volume in the spot market. It is interesting that when K * t > 0, the supplier's total risk var t [π s (Q t , f t , K * t , p T ] is always independent of the forward contract (Q t , f t ). This is because the forward contract does not affect the marginal expected profit with respect to the reservation capacity cost.
Corollary 1 basically states that the manufacturer purchases a forward if the hedging benefit and/or the speculation benefit are high.
Proposition 1 provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the variance of the manufacturer's equilibrium profit with the forward contract to be less than that without any forward contract. When this condition is satisfied, the manufacturer reduces her profit risk by trading in the forward market.
Proposition 2 states that the variance of the supplier's equilibrium profit is never lower than his profit variance without a forward. However, this does not imply that the supplier always trades the forward only for its speculation benefit. As a matter of fact, as shown in Table 1 , 20 the supplier uses the forward to hedge his risk in most cases. Take Case 4, for example. 21 In this case, the supplier's expected profit from the forward is negative. Therefore it must be that the forward helps reduce his profit risk. Indeed,ĉ t < µ pt in this case, and the supplier is thus technologically efficient enough to make a positive expected profit from trading only 19 The case K * t = 0 corresponds to the case where the supplier does not produce. This case is of less economic interest. In addition, the calibration conducted later shows that only the case K * t > 0 is practically relevant for the PJM market. Therefore, even though we will present results for the case with K * t = 0 for completeness, our discussion will focus on the case with K * t > 0 to save space.
20 See Appendix for proof.
21 The empirically calibrated model presented later belongs to this case. 
means that the forward provides hedging (speculation) benefit to the participant.
, µpt −ĉt > 0, and COVt > 0; Case 3: Case 2 except that COVt < 0 and θ is low enough; Case 4: Case 3 except that θ is high enough; Case 5: Case 2 except that µpt −ĉt < 0 and COVt < 0; Case 6:
in the spot market. Increasing the amount to sell to the spot market would increase his expected profit but would also increase his profit risk. This tradeoff determines the optimal level k * t . When the supplier can also trade in a forward market, he can now increase the sale amount to the spot market from k * t to K * t − Q * t to increase his expected profit while using the forward to hedge the risk. In the net, the supplier's expected total profit (from the spot and from the forward) increases and the total variance stays the same compared to the case without a forward.
The FOCs (18), (20), (19), and (21) offer a way to price forward contracts at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. The following proposition shows the limiting behavior of the contract terms.
As expected, as time-to-maturity approaches zero, the effective marginal cost approaches the spot price at the delivery which is necessary to rule out arbitrage.
Next we provide some of the comparative statics on the equilibrium contract. The comparative statics with respect to the means and standard deviations of the current spot price, the final product sales price, and the commodity demand are distribution dependent, and will be discussed through our numerical study in the next section. The following comparative statics with respect to the relative market power θ, risk coefficients λ m , λ s , and capacity reservation cost c t are independent of distribution assumptions. (2) Q * t increases in λ m if and only if µ pt <ĉ t and COV t < 0; f * t increases in λ m if and only if COV t < 0;Ũ * m andŨ * s increases in λ m if and only if
Proposition 4 states some intuitive comparative statics regardless of whether the supplier produces or not. The equilibrium forward open interest Q * t is independent of the negotiation power. This is because the open interest is chosen to maximize the total utility gain which is independent of the negotiation power of any party. The distribution of the total gain between the supplier and the manufacturer is, on the other hand, affected by the negotiation power through the equilibrium forward price. Intuitively, as the manufacturer's relative market power increases, the equilibrium forward price moves in the direction that favors the manufacturer, and so does the manufacturer's equilibrium utility gain from the forward contract.
As discussed in Corollary 1, the equilibrium forward quantity is determined by the speculation benefit and the hedging benefit. Intuitively as the manufacturer's risk aversion increases, the speculation benefit decreases and the hedging benefit increases. 22 Thus the equilibrium open interest increases and the equilibrium forward price moves in the direction that favors the supplier because the increased hedging benefit for the manufacturer enables the supplier to raise the forward price. Part one of Proposition 5 states some comparative statics for the case of positive production. When K * t > 0 andĉ t < µ pt , the supplier's utility gain (f t −ĉ t )Q t from the forward contract is independent of his risk aversion. Thus the equilibrium forward price as well as the equilibrium utility gains of the manufacturer are also unaffected by the supplier's risk aversion coefficient. Whenĉ t > µ pt , the supplier's utility gain is now dependent on his risk aversion. Accordingly, the more risk averse is the supplier, the less gain he receives from trading in the forward market and hence the higher forward price he demands in the negotiation. Finally, as the capacity reservation cost increases, the forward becomes less attractive and thus the equilibrium open interest decreases.
III. Numerical Analysis
To better understand how the equilibrium forward price and the equilibrium open interest are affected by various fundamental parameters, we perform some numerical analyses in this section after calibrating our model to an electricity forward data set.
Following Schwartz (1997) , we assume that the spot price p t evolves as the following OrnsteinUhlenbeck process: dp t = κ(µ − log(p t ))p t dt + σp t dz t , where κ, µ, and σ are all constants and z t is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. This implies that the spot price p t at time t ∈ [0, T ] is log-normally distributed with
where F 0 is the information set at time 0. In addition, we also assume that the quantity demanded D T and sales price s T for the manufacturer's final product are also log-normally distributed with means µ D , µ s and
s . Let ρ pD , ρ ps and ρ sD be the respective correlations among p T , D T , and s T . Moreover, for simplicity we assume that the capacity reservation cost c t for delivery at time T is equal to (1 − α) p t e −δ(T −t) , where δ represents the benefit of earlier commitment. This particular form also simplifies our later estimation process because it implies that the equilibrium forward contract is independent of the variable production cost α. As δ increases, the reservation cost becomes lower for a given time-tomaturity. The effect of a change in δ is thus the same as the effect of the "convenience yield" from a storable commodity, where the net cash and carry cost decreases as the convenience yield increases. We will therefore refer to δ as "convenience yield" (to the supplier).
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Since electricity is one of the most important nonstorable commodities that are actively traded, we calibrate our model to an electricity data set to gain further insights from the model. Specifically, we use the three-month-ahead electricity forward data in the PJM market for the calibration. We choose this market because it is one of the first markets to implement real-time market pricing of power and because daily three-month-ahead forward price price data is available for this market. The PJM daily data covers only the first month for each three-month-ahead forward contract for the period from April 1997 through June 2000.
To minimize the impact of seasonality, we divide the data into four seasons: winter, spring, summer, and fall.
We then estimate the parameters separately for these seasons. Given the observed forward price, spot price, and the time to maturity, we minimize the sum of squared errors to obtain parameter estimates. Specifically, 23 Convenience yield can be linked to the supplier's capability of just-in-time (JIT) production (for example, the supplier's capability to source raw materials and make production planning). A larger δ corresponds to a stronger JIT capability and thus a lower reservation cost. for observation i, let f i be the observed forward price, p i be the spot price, and τ i be the time-to-maturity.
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We then choose κ, µ, σ, µ D , σ D , µ s , σ s , ρ ps , ρ pD , ρ sD , λ m , λ s , δ, and θ to
where f * i is as defined in Theorem 1, and n is the number of observations for a season. It turns out that in the calibrated model, we always have K * t > 0 and U − s0 = 0, which implies that f * i is independent of λ s . We thus arbitrarily set λ s = 1. Table 2 displays the parameter estimates obtained from the above estimation. For this analysis we interpret λ m , λ s , and θ to be the parameters for the marginal manufacturer and the marginal supplier in the market. It is interesting to note that the manufacturer has the lowest market power and the supplier has the lowest convenience yield in summer. This may be caused by the higher demand and the capacity bottleneck that arise usually in summer.
Since almost all the qualitative results for winter and summer are similar to those for spring and fall, we only report numerical analysis results for spring and fall, except in Figure 3 , where an opposite pattern obtains for summer due to the difference mentioned above.
A. Changes in the spot price Figure 1 plots the time 0 equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of spot price p 0 for fall and spring. Recall that in the case with storable commodities ("the benchmark case"), the absence of arbitrage dictates that the forward price f B 0 in the benchmark case must be equal to p 0 e (r−δ)T , which implies in particular that the forward price increases with the spot price. In contrast, with nonstorable commodities, the forward price can be nonmonotonic in the spot price. As discussed before, the equilibrium forward price is largely determined by the manufacturer's and supplier's utility gain from the forward and their relative market powers. On the one hand, as the current spot price p 0 increases, the expected spot price µ p0 of p T increases.
With a higher expected spot price, the benefit from speculation for the manufacturer also increases ("effect on speculation benefit") and thus raises the forward price. On the other hand, a higher spot price p 0 tends to decrease the magnitude of the covariance COV 0 , which in turn reduces the benefit from hedging for 24 Since a PJM electricity forward contract calls for a continuous delivery of electricity in the maturity month, we use the 15th day in the maturity month as the maturity date in computing the time-to-maturity. The graph plots the time 0 equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of s pot price p0, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 .
the manufacturer ("effect on hedging benefit"). The reduction of the hedging benefit tends to lower the equilibrium forward price. The net effect of an increase in the spot price p 0 on the forward price depends on the relative magnitudes of these two offsetting effects. In both spring and fall, when p 0 is small the effect on speculation dominates, and when p 0 grows, the effect on hedging becomes more important. Interestingly, when p 0 grows further, the effect on speculation becomes dominant again and thus the forward price starts to increase again because of the nonmonotonic nature of these two effects. The speed of increase is much higher for spring because the convenience yield δ in spring is much lower than it is in fall. Since the hedging benefit from a forward largely depends on the covariance between the profit from the forward and the profit from the spot, this nonmonotonic pattern of the forward price against the spot price suggests that the profit covariance is important in forward pricing on nonstorable commodities in the presence of market powers. Figure 2 plots the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 for spring and fall as functions of the time-to-maturity τ (in years).
B. Term structures
25 With a high convenience yield δ for both spring and fall, the supplier's capacity reservation cost is low and is only a small fraction of the spot price. In addition, the market power of the manufacturer is high for these seasons; therefore the equilibrium forward price f * 0 is always below the expected spot price and thus exhibits a normal backwardation for both seasons. This also suggests that the forward price is a The graph plots the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of time-to-maturity τ , given other parameters as shown in Table 2 .
downward biased predictor of the spot price.
Moreover, while the forward price is monotonically decreasing in the time-to-maturity τ for fall, it displays a hump shape for spring. The decreasing trends for both seasons are due to the rapid reduction of capacity reservation cost as τ increases. For spring, however, hedging benefit is stronger than the decreasing capacity reservation cost for short time-to-maturity forwards and thus causes the forward price to initially increase with the time-to-maturity. In contrast, the forward price in summer is always above the expected spot price, as shown in Figure 3 , and is thus an upward biased predictor of the spot price. This difference is mainly due to the low convenience yield and low market power of the manufacturer. These findings on the biases of the forward price in predicting the spot price are similar to those found by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) . Figure 4 shows that the open interest increases with time-to-maturity for fall and decreases with time-to-maturity for spring. This difference in the open interest term structure is mainly due to the difference in the convenience yield across spring and fall. As the time-to-maturity increases, the expected time τ spot prices increase for both seasons, which makes the forward more attractive to the manufacturer because of the greater speculation benefit. However, compared to fall, the convenience yield for the supplier is lower and therefore his capacity reservation cost is higher in spring. On the other hand, as the time-to-maturity increases, the time τ spot price variance σ 
for a forward contract maturing at T against time t (which implies that the time-to-maturity τ = T − t) for spring and fall. This figure shows that the expected forward price is always less than the expected spot price for fall. However, for spring, the expected forward price can be higher than the expected spot price when the time-to-maturity is long. Figure 6 plots the equilibrium forward price volatility σ f * t = var 0 [f * t ] for a forward contract maturing at T against time t for spring and fall. This figure shows in particular that the forward price volatility is lower than the spot price volatility. In addition, the "Samuelson effect" (see Samuelson (1965) ) holds, i.e., as time-to-maturity τ = T − t decreases, the forward price volatility increases. Furthermore, as time-tomaturity decreases, the forward price volatility increases more quickly than the spot price volatility. This difference is also driven by the convenience yield. When the time-to-maturity is long, the convenience yield causes the forward price to be only a fraction of the spot price. This implies that the forward price has a lower volatility and a slower increase than the spot price as τ decreases. As the contract gets closer to its maturity, the effect of the convenience yield declines, which causes the forward volatility to rise more quickly.
Similar to the forward price volatility pattern, Figure 7 shows that the equilibrium open interest volatility also increases for both spring and fall as the time-to-maturity decreases. The graph plots the expected equilibrium forward price µ f * t against time for a forward contract maturing at T for spring and fall, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 . The graph plots the equilibrium forward price volatility σ f * t against time for a forward contract maturing at T for spring and fall, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 .
Figure 8: Equilibrium forward prices as functions of spot price volatility
The graph plots the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of spot price volatility σp0, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 .
C. Changes in Risks
In our model, there are three correlated risks that affect the equilibrium forward contract: Spot price risk, commodity demand risk, and final product sales price risk. To understand the difference among their effects, we examine how the changes in these risks affect the equilibrium forward contract.
Figures 8 and 9 plot respectively the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 and the open interests Q * 0 as functions of the spot price volatility σ p0 . As the spot price risk increases, the forward prices for both seasons increase. Intuitively, an increase in the price risk makes it more valuable to use a forward contract to hedge against this price risk. Therefore the manufacturer is willing to pay a higher forward price. Compared to fall, the spring forward price increases at a slower rate because for spring, the market power of the manufacturer is greater than it is for fall. Figure 9 shows that for fall, as the price risk increases, the open interest first increases and then decreases, while for spring, the pattern is opposite. To understand this opposite pattern, let us first consider the case for fall. As the price risk increases, the benefit of hedging increases, so the open interest also increases. However, as the price risk increases further, the forward price becomes higher, and thus the cost of hedging increases. Therefore eventually, the open interest starts to fall. For spring, when the price risk is low, the cost of hedging is greater than the hedging benefit of increasing open interest. However, when the price risk continues to grow, it eventually becomes more important to increase the open interest to hedge the increase of risk. Since for spring the manufacturer has a high market power, the increase in open interest will not cause much increase in the forward price. These tradeoffs produce the opposite pattern for spring. Figure 9 : Equilibrium open interests as functions of spot price volatility
The graph plots the equilibrium open interests Q * 0 as functions of spot price volatility σp0, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 .
Figures 10 and 11 plot the equilibrium forward prices and open interests as functions of the commodity demand volatility σ D . In contrast to a change in spot price risk, a change in the demand volatility has a smaller impact on the equilibrium forward contract because a forward is more effective against price risk than against quantity risk. By Theorem 1, it is clear that the demand uncertainty affects the equilibrium forward contract only through its impact on the profit covariance. As the demand uncertainty increases, the absolute value of the profit covariance increases for fall but decreases for spring because of the very high negative correlation between the demand and the final product price in spring. These covariance patterns imply that the hedging benefit increases for fall but decreases for spring, which in turn implies the patterns in the two figures.
Figures 12 and 13 plot the equilibrium forward prices and open interests as functions of the final product sales price volatility σ s respectively. As σ s increases, the benefit of hedging decreases; therefore, the equilibrium forward prices and open interests decrease for both seasons. Table 3 shows how the equilibrium forward contract and the equilibrium welfare vary with fundamental parameters. This table confirms the analytical comparative statics we provide above and also shows the effects of some other parameters.
D. Changes in Other Parameters
As the expected spot price increases, the profit of the manufacturer from selling the final product tends to decrease. This transfers into a lower forward price and a smaller open interest to increase the The graph plots the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of demand volatility σD, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . The graph plots the equilibrium forward prices f * 0 as functions of final product price volatility σs, given other parameters as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 .
expected profit from the forward contract for the manufacturer. In addition, the utility gain also becomes smaller. An increase in the expected demand causes an increase in the forward price, in the open interest, and also in the utility gain. We also observe a similar pattern for the effect of an increase in the expected final product price. Intuitively, this is because as the expected demand or the expected final product price increases, both the profitability and the hedging benefit of the manufacturer increase.
When the spot price volatility increases, the hedging benefit increases and thus the gain from the equilibrium forward contract increases. In contrast, as the final product price volatility increases, the hedging benefit decreases and thus the gain from the equilibrium forward contract decreases. When the demand volatility increases, the utility gain increases for fall, but decreases for spring. This reflects the different patterns in Figures 10 and 11 for fall and spring.
As the manufacturer gets more risk-averse, the benefit of hedging increases and thus the utility gain increases.
26 Because both the supplier and the manufacturer have significant market powers, the forward price increases, and the open interest decreases as a result of their negotiation.
As the convenience yield increases, the cost of reserving capacity decreases and hence the forward price decreases and open interest increases. In addition, both the manufacturer and the supplier become better off due to the sharing of this technology improvement.
IV. Conclusions and discussion
We consider an equilibrium forward contract on a nonstorable commodity in an imperfectly competitive forward market. Due to market participants' market powers, the forward contract is negotiated through a Nash bargaining process. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium, derive the equilibrium forward contract in closed form, and provide an extensive comparative statics analysis. We show in particular that the introduction of a forward market may increase both the production of the commodity and the trading volume in the spot market. We then calibrate our model to an electricity data set and conduct an numerical analysis. We find that in contrast to the forward price on a storable commodity, the forward price on a nonstorable one can be nonmonotonic in the spot price. We show that the forward price can be a downward or an upward biased predictor of the spot price, depending on the convenience yield level and the market power. In addition, both the forward price volatility and the open interest volatility decrease with time-tomaturity. Furthermore, for commodities with low convenience yield, the open interest is greater for a shorter maturity forward.
The framework used in the paper can be applied to study more complex bilateral contracts when market power is present. This model only considers the case with one representative seller and one representative buyer in the forward market. Therefore it is obviously only a reduced form of the actual forward 26 However the total utility of the manufacturer decreases as his risk aversion increases. market. An interesting but challenging extension would be to allow multiple sellers and multiple buyers to trade strategically in both the forward market and the spot market. 
